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THE ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAX:
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EARNINGS AND
PROFITS AND ACCUMULATED TAXABLE INCOME
IN A REDEMPTION TRANSACTION
RrcHARD L. DOE.NBERG*
INTRODUCTION

Differences in individual and corporate tax rate structures create an often
irresistible temptation to use corporations as a shield against the individual
income tax.1 Congress recognized this temptation as early as 1913 and moved to
eliminate it by taxing the shareholders of offending corporations. 2 The successor to the early legislation is today's accumulated earnings tax,8 which is levied
against the corporation itself.
Internal Revenue Code section 532(a) applies the accumulated earnings tax
to corporations that accumulate earnings and profits beyond an amount needed
to meet reasonable business needs in order to avoid the individual income tax.4
If section 532(a)'s requirements are met, section 531 imposes a penalty on accumulated taxable income, which is defined as taxable income with specified
adjustments less the dividends paid and the accumulated earnings credit.5
Differing measures for triggering the tax, known as the "triggering measure,"
and for computing the liability, known as the "base measure," can prompt
the accumulated earnings tax to be applied in a most peculiar situation: when
there is no accumulation of current earnings.
To those familiar with the Code it is not surprising that the accumulated
earnings tax can be levied on a corporation that has distributed all of its earnings and profits for the period at issue. To illustrate: X Corporation, a calendar
year taxpayer, formed in 1950, has one million dollars of accumulated earnings
and profits as of December 31, 1978. There are no further accumulations in
1979 or 1980. In 1981, X has $200,000 of earnings and profits from operations
*Assistant Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. B.A., 1970, Yale; MA.T.,
1972, Wesleyan University; J.D., University of Connecticut; LL.M., 1980, New York University.
1. B. Brrm'R, FEzRAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GITs § 95.1.1 (1981).
2. Tariff Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 16, § n, 38 Stat. 114, 116 (1913).
3. I.R.C. §§ 531-37 (1976).
4. I.R.C. § 532(a) (1976) reads:

The accumulated earnings tax imposed by section 531 shall apply to every corporation
(other than those described in subsection (b)) formed or availed for the purpose of
avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders or the shareholders of any
other corporation, by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being
divided or distributed.
Id.

5. Id. §535(a). In years after 1981 the minimum accumulated earnings credit is increased
from $150,000 to $250,000 except for certain service corporations. See id. § 535(c)(2)-(3) (West
1982).
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that it uses to redeem one shareholder's stock, leaving no current earnings.,
Thus in 1981, X has not accumulated any earnings and, depending on the
circumstances, may have actually distributed prior earnings. X may nevertheless find itself with an accumulated earnings tax liability. Under existing law
redeeming a single shareholder's stock does not reduce accumulated taxable
income even though the redeeming corporation's earnings and profits are
reduced.

7

Rather than focusing upon arguments concerning whether profit accumulation is justified in particular cases, this article examines two issues, the analysis
of which may render justification analysis unnecessary.8 The first issue is
whether current earnings and profits are necessary to trigger the accumulated
earnings tax provisions. The second issue, which has been largely unexamined
is whether redemptions are distributions that qualify for the dividends paid
deduction and thereby reduce accumulated taxable income.9 In a situation
where a redemption reduces current earnings and profits to zero, a determination either that the accumulated earnings tax is inapplicable or that the redemption distribution also reduces the applicable tax base obviates consideration of whether the use of current earnings for redemption has a reasonable
business purpose.
REDEMPTIONS TO

AVOID

ACCUMULATED EARNINGS

TAXATION: CONTRASTING JUDICIAL VIEWS

GPD, Inc. v. Commissioner- is the leading case in the area. In GPD, the

6. Under I.R.C. § 312(e) (1976) the proper charge to capital account is the pro rata
portion of contributed capital allocable to the redeemed shares. See Helvering v. Jarvis, 128
F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1941); Rev. Rul. 376, 1979-2 C.B. 133.
7. One commentator has suggested taxing accumulated taxable income only to the extent
of current earnings and profits. Neither statute nor case law supports this interpretation.
See Note, The Computation of Earnings and Profits for Purposes of the Accumulated Earnings
Tax, 20 TAX L. REv. 733, 739 (1965). For an energetic debate over the proposal, see Edestein,
Earnings and Profits and the Accumulated Earnings Tax, 23 TAX L. R~v. 419 (1968); Edelstein, Earnings and Profits and the Accumulated Earnings Tax: A Further Dissent, 23 TAX
L. REv. 423, 425 (1968) [hereinafter cited as A Further Dissent]; Sitrick, Earnings and Profits
and the Accumulated Earnings Tax: A Reply, 23 TAX L. REv. 420, 421 (1968).
I.R.C. § 535 (1976) which defines accumulated taxable income refers to the dividends paid
deduction in § 561. Section 561(b) incorporates the rules of § 562. Section 562(b) does permit
certain liquidation distributions including partial liquidations to qualify for the dividends
paid deductions. Section 346(a) treats a redemption under § 302 as a partial liquidation for
purposes of I.R.C. § 562(b). See Treas. Reg. § 1.561-1(b) (1960). I.R.C. § 562(c) (1976), however,
limits the dividends paid deductions to nonpreferential, pro rata distributions. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.562-2(b) (1960) Ex. 2 clearly slates the Service's position that a redemption involving less
than all of the shareholders will be deemed preferential.
8. See generally B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS ffff 8.01-.09
(4th ed. 1979); Herwitz, Stock Redemption and the Accumulated
Earnings Tax, 74 HARV. L. REv. 866 (1961).
9. I.R.C. § 562(c) (1976). While § 562(c) requires distributions to be "pro rata, with no
preference" to qualify for the dividends paid deduction, those terms are not defined. Id.
10. 508 F.2d 1076 (6th Cir. 1974), rev'g 60_T.C. 480 (1973). For a discussion of GPD, see
Rudolph, Stock Redemptions and the Accumulated Earnings Tax -An
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sole GPD, Inc. shareholder periodically donated highly appreciated stock to
various charities, securing for himself sizeable charitable deductions while
avoiding taxation on the stock's appreciation." Subsequent to the charitable
transfer, the corporation would redeem the stock the charitable donees held in
a tax-free transaction because the donees were tax-exempt organizations. 2 After
determining'that GPD had allowed its earnings and profits to accumulate
beyond the reasonable needs of the business in 1967 in order to eliminate the
sole shareholder's individual tax liability, the Tax Court assessed the accumulated earnings tax for 1967.13 For the 1968 tax year, however, the court
found that the redemptions reduced GPD's current earnings to zero, thereby
precluding imposition of the tax. 4
The Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax Court, finding that the legislative
history underlying the accumulated earnings tax indicated current earnings
were not a prerequisite for imposition of the tax.15 Having made that determination, the court concluded the redemption was not pro rata within the
meaning of section 562(c) and therefore could reduce GPD's accumulated taxable income.' 6
The problem raised by GPD is not isolated. It arose before that case' 7 and
has surfaced again recently in Lamark Shipping Agency, Inc. v. Commissioner'8 when the Service imposed the accumulated earnings tax for a year in
which the corporation had distributed all its current earnings in the form of a
redemption. The taxpayer neglected to raise the current earnings issue. 19
Nevertheless, the Tax Court sua sponte recognized the Sixth Circuit's approach
in GPD, but then refused to reexamine that "fairly nettlesome legal issue."
While GPD is the law in the Sixth Circuit, the Tax Court pointedly noted it is
"not constrained" to follow decisions appealable to other circuits. 2 0 The court
thus avoided the threshold issue of whether the accumulated earnings tax
should be applied and turned to the question of justification, examining
whether the hypothetical accumulation of current earnings exceeded Lamark's
reasonable business needs for the year in question. 2'

TAx 101 (1977); Comment, GPD, Inc. v. Commissioner: Closing a Loophole in the Accumulated Earnings Tax, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 651 (1975).
11. 60 T.C. at 485.
12. Id. at 485-86.
13. Id. at 487, 496.
14. Id. at 491.
15. 508 F.2d at 1087.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Ostendorf-Morris Co. v. United States, 26 A..T.R.2d (P-H) ff 70,5369 (N.D.
Ohio 1968) (relied on heavily by the Sixth Circuit in GPD).

18. 1981 T.C.M. (P-H) ff81,284.

19. Instead the taxpayer tried to prove that the redemption was reasonable, thereby
justifying the accumulation. See I.R.C. §§ 532 (1976), 537 (1976 & Supp. I 1979).
20. 1981 T.C.M. (P-H) at ff 81,974. See Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970),
aff'd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
21. Id.
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THE NECESSITY OF CURRENT EARNINGS TO
IMPOSE THE ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAX

It is difficult to understand how there can be accumulated earnings tax
liability for a year in which there are no earnings accumulated, merely because
there were accumulated earnings derived in prior years, some of which may
be closed under the statute of limitations..22 Consider X Corporation formed in
year one. In each of its first ten years X does well, increasing its earnings each
year and reinvesting most of those earnings. During these years the Service
does not challenge the accumulations as unreasonable. After a successful
eleventh year, X uses all of its current earnings to redeem the holdings of one
of its shareholders. The redemption decreases the current earnings and profits
account to zero.2 3 If the accumulated earnings in years one through ten were
not considered unreasonable in years one through ten, why do the same earnings suddenly become unreasonable in year eleven, a year in which there are
no additional current earnings? While prior earnings and profits may have a
bearing on whether accumulation of current earnings is unreasonable, 24 reevaluation of past accumulated earnings and profits when there are no current
earnings and profits results in an unlimited statute of limitations for assessing
the accumulated earnings tax.

25

The Tax Court in GPD concluded that absent any current earnings and
profits, the accumulated earnings tax could not be imposed.2 6 The court relied
on American Metal Products Corp. v. Commissioner,27 in which the taxpayer's

22. See I.R.C. § 6501 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
23. See supra note 6.
24. See Treas. Reg. § 1.535-3(b)(1)(ii) (1960).
25. Commentators who view current earnings alone as a triggering measure include: S.
WEITHORN & R. NOALL, THE ACCUMULATED EARNINGs TAX §§ 4.23(6), 7.1 at 96-97 & 129-31
(1968); Edelstein, supra note 7, at 419; Sitrick, supra note 7, at 421; Pomeroy, Accumulations
and Distributions of Earnings and Profits, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 717, 721-22 (1966); Herwitz,
supra note 8, at 932.
With this view in mind, a number of commentators have recommended the use of redemptions to reduce current earnings and profits to zero, thereby avoiding the earnings tax.
See, e.g., Huffaker, Redemption of Stock to Pay Estate Taxes: Techniques of Pay-out, N.Y.U.
25TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 963, 979 (1967); Levithan, Defensive Planning to Avoid the 531 Tax
-Some Techniques to Use, 26 J. TAX'N 88, 92 (1967); Pomeroy, supra, at 721-22.
26. 60 T.C. at 491.
27. 34 T.C. 89 (1960), aff'd, 287 F.2d 860 (8th Cir. 1961).
The Tax Court decisions in both GPD and American Metal relied on two previous decisions
that are supportive, but are not direct authority. In W.S. Farish & Co. v. Commissioner, 38
B.T.A. 150 (1938), non acq., 1938-2 C.B. 43, aff'd, 104 F.2d 833 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
559 (1939), the Board of Tax Appeals noted: "Taxable net income is purely a statutory concept, and bears no necessary relation to gains and profits subject to distribution as
dividends . . . .The proscribed act is the accumulation of 'gains and profits' [now earnings
and profits] and not 'net income.'" Id. at 158, In Farish, though, the issue was the proper
method of accounting for property transferred to the corporation in what is now a § 351 exchange. The Board of Tax Appeals held that the cost of an asset for computing earnings
and profits might differ from the cost for computing taxable income. Id. In Corporate Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1156 (1939), non acq., 1940-1 C.B. 6, the Court commented:
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accumulated earnings and profits declined slightly in the year in question as a
result of the payment of a prior year's assessment of the accumulated earnings
tax. The tax payments eliminated the current earnings and profits but did not
affect accumulated taxable income. 28 GPD followed the conclusion in American Metal that the absence of current earnings and profits prevented application of the tax in that year, notwithstanding that the surplus was still unreason29
able.
The Sixth Circuit's reversal in GPD was based on two arguments, one legislative and one statutory, neither of which is satisfactory. The court first exhaustively examined the legislative history of the accumulated earnings tax
provisions, trying to prove that current earnings are not a requirement. After
examining the legislative history, the court examined the statutory provisions
themselves. Both of these arguments will be examined in turn.
Legislative History of the Accumulated Earnings Tax

There is no indication that applying the accumulated earnings tax withThe use of the words "to accumulate" instead of some such phrase as "to remain accumulated" is significant. Earnings of prior years may remain accumulated during the
year but are not permitted "to accumulate" during that year. If Congress had intended
to penalize the corporation for accumulating a surplus in prior years or for failing to
distribute such a surplus in the taxable year, it would hardly have measured the
penalty by the earnings of the current year or relieved the corporation from the penalty
upon condition that the earnings of the current year were distributed to or reported
by the stockholders.
Id. at 1172 (footnote omitted). However, the Court in Corporate Investment ruled for the
taxpayer not because there was an absence of current earnings and profits, but because no
improper motivation was found to exist in connection with earnings that were accumulated.
Id. at 1176.
28. Payment of the accumulated earnings tax does not reduce taxable income in computing accumulated taxable income. I.R.C. § 535(b)(1) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.535-2(a)(1)
(1960).
29. American Metal, 34 T.C. at 104. The Tax Court's view is more pointedly articulated
in Eastern Mach. Co. v. Commissioner, 1951 TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (P-H) ff51,312, where the
court stated:
The penalty surtax was not meant to be imposed upon a corporation because it failed
to distribute a surplus accumulated in prior years .... Rather, it is applicable only to
the case where there has been an accumulation during the taxable year of that year's
current earnings and profits in excess of the reasonable needs of the business, the
purpose being to avoid the levying of a surtax upon the shareholders.
Id. at U51,957. See also United Bus. Corp. of Am. v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 83 (1935);
Charleston Lumber Co. v. United States, 20 F. Supp. 83 (D. W. Va. 1937).
The Tax Court has, however, been guilty of loose language on at least one occasion. In
Ted Bates & Co. v. Commissioner, 1965 T.C.M. (P-H) U65,251, a corporation redeemed stock
held by a 70% founder of the corporation. Although the court found that the redemption
was for a sound business purpose, it also seemingly rejected the taxpayer's contention that
the redemption absorbed all the earnings and profits thereby making the tax inapplicable. Id.
at 1495-96. When confronted with its Ted Bates decision in GPD, the Tax Court dismissed
this interpretation, noting that in fact the redemption in Ted Bates had not wiped out all
the current earnings and profits and that the redemption qualified for a dividends paid deduction on other grounds. GPD, 60 T.C. at 493 n.7.
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out regard to current earnings ever occurred to legislators.3 0 Indeed, when
section II(A)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1913 was enacted, a corporation's unreasonable "gains and profits"'31 were taxed directly to the shareholders. Accordingly,
no disparity existed between the triggering measure and the base measure. 32
Moreover, redemptions warranted no special treatment in the 1913 Act.3 3 Like
any other distribution out of current earnings and profits, redemptions constituted a shareholder dividend while corporate earnings and profits were de34
creased accordingly.
While the Revenue Act of 1916 did not affect the accumulated earnings tax
provisions, 35 the Revenue Act of 1918 did make a subtle alteration that escaped congressional discussion. The triggering measure remained "gains and
profits," but the base measure of the tax became the corporation's net income. 36
Nevertheless, at this point in the legislative history, a corporate distribution
served to decrease both the triggering measure and base measure so that it was
impossible for a corporation to have no current gains and profits and still have
a large tax base. In defining the scope of the 1918 Act, the Service stated that
the accumulated earnings tax is prospective and "can not be utilized to force a
distribution of unnecessary surplus accumulated in prior years." 37 It prior ac-

cumulations could trigger the tax the Service would have applied the 1918 Act
to prior accumulations which corporations failed to distribute after 1918.
30. For a comprehensive review of the operation and economic impact of the accumulated
earnings tax provisions, see JOINT COMM. ON THE ECON. REP., THE TAXATION OF CORPORATE
SURPLUS ACCUMULATIONS, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 200-05 (Comm. Print 1952). The report does not
discuss the relationship of redemptions to the accumulated earnings tax and does not consider any situations where prior earnings and profits trigger a tax on a current tax base.
31. The term "gains and profits" remained in the accumulated earnings tax provisions
until enactment of the Revenue Act of 1936, when the term "earnings and profits" was
substituted with no intent to change existing law. S. REP. No. 2156, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 17,

1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 678, 689.
32. Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit strongly relies on a dialogue between Senators Borah
and Williams during the Senate debate as supporting its view. GPD, 508 F.2d at 1083-84. The

dialogue does not address the issue.
33.

It should be noted that redemptions were relatively uncommon transactions at this

point in corporate history. See generally Herwitz, supra note 8, at 866-99; Wormser, The
Power of a Corporationto Acquire its Own Stock, 24 YALE L.J. 177 (1915) (contrasting the
English and American rule concerning the right of a corporation to redeem its shares). The
term "redemption" did not enter the tax statutes until 1921. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch.
136, § 201(d), 42 Stat. 227, 228-29.
34. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1916, § 31(a), added by ch. 63, § 1211, 40 Stat. 337 (1917). To
the extent that a redemption was not made from earnings but instead was a distribution of
the capital stock account, the recipient would remain subject to the accumulated earnings tax
provisions. See O.D. 360, 2 C.B. 25 (1920).
35. See Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 3, 39 Stat. 756, 758.
36. Under Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 220, 40 Stat. 1057, 1072, the shareholders were
to be taxed in the same way as shareholders of personal service corporations. Thus, the
shareholders were accountable for their respective shares of any net income that was not distributed by the corporation during the taxable year. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 218(e),
40 Stat. 1057, 1070. See also Treas. Reg. 45, § 218, art. 325 (1918).
37. O.D. 188, 1 C.B. 182 (1919). The inexact and interchangeable use of "income" and
"surplus" suggests that the base amount and the triggering amount were viewed as
equivalents.
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In 1921, in response to judicial doubt concerning the constitutionality of
taxing shareholders for the accumulated earnings of a corporation, Congress
shifted the incidence of the tax from the shareholders to the corporation. 38 The
trigger remained gains and profits and the base remained net income. Unlike
the 1918 Act, however, the net income base under the 1921 Act was not decreased by amounts the corporation distributed to shareholders. 39 Theoretically,
under the 1921 Act, a distribution could decrease current gains and profits to
zero without diminishing the corporation's net income.40 Congress did not
consider the propriety of using prior accumulated profits in such situations
to trigger the tax. The Service, however, amplified its 1918 ruling and declared
that past accumulations were considered relevant only in assessing the reasonableness of any current accumulation of gains and profits and would not be
used to trigger a tax on net income.41
The Revenue Act of 1924 provided redemptions special preference. The
statute included in its definition of "amounts distributed in partial liquidation"
distributions "in complete cancellation or redemption of stock" and provided
exchange treatment for such partial liquidations, thereby allowing capital
gains status for redemptions.42 Moreover, section 201(c), the progenitor of
38. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 220, 42 Stat. 227, 247-48. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252
US. 189 (1920). In Eisner, the Supreme Court held a stock dividend issued by Standard Oil
Company was not "income" for purposes of the 1916 Revenue Act or the constitutional requirement that income taxes be apportioned equally among the states. Id. at 210-12. See
U.S. CONsr. amend. 16. The Court examined the accumulated earnings of a corporation and
indicated that if distribution were mare by cash dividend this would be shareholder income
that the 1916 Act may tax in an unconstitutional manner. 252 U.S. at 212-16.
39. Compare Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, §§ 232-34, 42 Stat. 227, 254-57 with Revenue
Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 218(e), 40 Stat. 1070. If the shareholders under the Revenue Act of 1921
elected to be taxed as partners, their share of net income would reflect distributions in the
same manner as under the 1918 Act. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, §§ 218(a), 42 Stat. 227,
245 & 247.
40. An indication of this potential can be found in an example by an early commentator:
"If a corporation held liable [under § 220] had received in the taxable year profits of
$800,000 ... and if $400,000 had been distributed as dividends to its shareholders, the statute
would levy the 50 per cent tax on the total $800,000 of income." Wood, Corporations Which
Are Subject to a Punitive Tax Rule, 3 TAxEs 55 (1925). For a discussion of the distinction
between "net income" and "earnings and profits," see Charles F. Ayer v. Commissioner, 12
B.T.A. 283, 287 (1928) (decided under the 1921 Act).
41. I.T. 1572, 11-1 C.B. 139 (1921). See also HOLmES, FEDmAL TAXEs 262 (6th ed. 1925).
42. See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 201(g) (defining "partial liquidation'), 201(c)
(providing exchange treatment), 208(b) (setting a 12 2 % maximum tax on capital gains), 43
Stat. 253, 255, 263.
For a brief period from 1918 to 1921, § 201(c) of the Revenue Act of 1918 provided that
liquidating distributions received exchange treatment, but no reference was made to either
partial liquidations or redemptions. There is no indication that during this period redemptions
were treated any differently from dividends. See Helmich v. Hellman, 18 F.2d 239 (8th Cir.
1927) (gain realized in liquidation treated as dividend); Frank Darrow'v. Commissioner, 8
B.T.A. 276 (1927) (distributions in liquidation to extent of accumulated -earnings are
dividends).
The 1924 Act also eliminated the election available to shareholders under the 1921 Act to
include their distributive share of the corporation's net income in their individual returns.
The elimination of the option was an effort to enhance enforcement. S. REP. No. 398, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. 26, 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 266, 284.
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current section 312(e), provided that the portion of the redemption proceeds
not chargeable to the corporation's capital account constituted a distribution
of earnings and profits.
It was theoretically possible under the 1924 Act for a corporation to distribute all of its current profits in a redemption that provided capital gains
treatment to the shareholders while eliminating the corporation's current gains
and profits but not its net income.4s There is no hint in the legislative history
that Congress was concerned with the bailout potential of the redemption on
corporate earnings and profits. Even before the 1924 Act it was possible to
extract corporate earnings and profits by allocating a preferential dividend to
a shareholder in a low tax bracket. Such a transaction would decrease earnings
and profits without affecting the corporation's net income. 44 After 1924, the
bailout could be accomplished at a capital gains rate to shareholders; however,
there is no indication that because of capital gains treatment to shareholders
corporations were to be judged on accumulated earnings of years prior to the
45
one in question.
Congress was concerned that as a result of the 1924 Act shareholders would,
through the mechanism of pro rata redemptions, try to convert ordinary
dividends into more favorable capital gains or even nontaxable returns of
capital.46 Consequently, the Revenue Act of 1926 provided that any redemption which was essentially equivalent to a dividend 47 would be treated as a
43. It is not clear that the 1924 Act envisaged non-pro rata redemptions at all. See
James D. Robinson v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 1018, 1021-22 (1933), afJ'd, 69 F.2d 972 (5th
Cir. 1934).
44. See supra note 40.
45. Under I.R.C. §§ 562(b) & 346(a) (1976) it is clear that redemptions satisfying the prorata requirements of § 562(c) decrease not only earnings and profits, but also the base measure
for the accumulated earnings tax. See also id. § 535(c). This suggests that availability of capital
gains treatment to shareholders is unrelated to whether prior earnings and profits trigger
the tax in the first instance. See also H.R. REP. No. 2475, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1936) where
under the 1936 Act the tax base for applying the accumulated earnings tax was reduced by
distribution even if the recipients were exempt from taxation.
46. An illustrative example appearing consistently in the 1926 committee reports states:
Assume that two men hold practically all the stock in a corporation, for which each had
paid $50,000 in cash, and the corporation had accumulated a surplus of $50,000 above its
cash capital. It is claimed that under existing law the corporation could buy from the
stockholders, for cash, one-half of the stock held by them and cancel it without making
the stockholders subject to any tax. Yet this action, in all essentials, would be the
equivalent of a distribution through cash dividends of the earned surplus.
H.R. REP. No. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1926); S. REP. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1926);
H.R. REP. No. 356, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1926). The reports went on to say that § 201(g)
of the Revenue Act of 1926 was intended to make clear that such a distribution would be
taxable as a dividend. Id.
47. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 201(g), 44 Stat. 9, 11. The "essentially equivalent"
language of § 201(d) finds its origin in § 201(d) of the Revenue Act of 1921. Revenue Act of
1921, ch. 136, § 201(d), 42 Stat. 227, 228-29. Congress recognized that on the strength of Eisner
v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), nontaxable stock dividends might be issued and then redcemed as a substitute for ordinary cash dividends. Section 201(d) provided that a redemption
after the distribution of such a stock dividend could be taxed if "essentially equivalent" to a
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dividend. This change was intended to ensure that as a condition to capital
gains treatment, distributions by redemption involved the surrender of some
significant equity interest. The Revenue Act of 1926 also reinstated the shareholder's option of having the corporation's net income, whether distributed
or not, taxed directly to the shareholder rather than subjecting the corporation
to the accumulated earnings tax.48
In 1927, the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation issued a
comprehensive report on the enforcement of the accumulated earnings provisions. 49 The report criticizes the Bureau's enforcement of the provision, 0
and is significant in two respects. First, none of the over seventy-five cases discussed involved the interplay between the imposition of the tax and a redemption transaction. Second, the report consistently analyzes each case in terms
of the relationship between the amounts distributed and the corporation's
current profits, concluding that the tax would be inapplicable if all the current
profits were distributed. 1
dividend. In 1924, § 201(0 was enacted to reach situations where the redemption preceded
the stock dividend. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §201(f, 43 Stat. 253, 255. Finally, in 1926,
§ 201(g) amended §201(f of the 1924 Act to apply to any redemption "essentially equivalent"
to a dividend whether or not connected with a stock dividend. See Herwitz, supra note 8, at
886-99; Bittker, Stock Redemptions and PartialLiquidations Under the InternalRevenue Code
of 1954, 9 STAN. L. REv. 13, 14-15 (1956); Note, Stock Redemption or Cancellation Taxable as

Dividend, 49 H.v. L. REV. 1344 (1936).
48. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §220(e), 44 Stat. 9, 34-35. See S. REP. No. 52, 69th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 22, 1939-1 CJ3. (Pt. 2) 332, 348-49.
49.

JoINT CoM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAX'N, 69rH CONG. DIVISION OF INVESTIGATION
ON EVASION OF SURTAXES BY INCORPORATION (SECTION 220) (Comm. Print 1927)
[hereinafter cited as REPORT].

Pr. 3,

REPORT

50. The Report noted that not one dollar had been collected from the provision from
1918 to the time of issuance of the REPORT. REPORT, supra note 49, at 33, 38.
51. See for example, the discussion of Company No. 101 where the Committee noted: "It
is apparent from the above that the distribution of dividends in the year 1921 was nearly
equal to the profit and that the application of section 220 to that year could not be sustained."
REPORT, supra note 49, at 47. It should be noted that Company No. 101 had also fully distributed its net income in 1921, but that was not the focus of the analysis in this or in other
cases. Id.

Indeed, congressional focus on the relationship between current profits and distributions
as the trigger was apparent in a context diametrically opposite to that presented in GPD.
GPD involves a corporation without current earnings and profits but with a large tax base.
In the REPORT, the joint committee noted its concern with corporations which had large
profits but no net income (tax base) on which the tax could be applied. This condition arose
because domestic dividends were includible in profits but not in net income of a corporation.
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 88 232, 234(a)(6), 42 Stat. 227, 254-55. Even though there was
no tax base, the unreasonable profits of such corporations were the object of congressional
concern. In 1924, Congress provided that "net income" as used in § 220 included dividends
received from domestic corporations. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 220(d), 43 Stat. 253, 277.
At least at this point in the legislative history, it seems apparent that Congress' concern was
to ensure distribution of profits in a taxable year and that the tax base was just that - a base if
adequate profits were not distributed. This suggests that if all the profits in a taxable year
were distributed, the congressional objective would be satisfied even if net income remained.
In fact, under the language of provisions prior to 1934, dividends did not reduce "net income." As a result, the Service would have been free to tax a corporation which had distributed all of its current profits on its "net income" if prior profits were accumulated un-
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The Sixth Circuit in GPD placed great emphasis on a proposal rejected in
the Revenue Act of 1928. The House attempted to substitute the words "to remain accumulated" for "to accumulate" in the provision." However, the House
Report asserted the proposed wording was "substantially the same" as prior
law. 53 On the strength of the House Report and the Senate's silent rejection of
the House's proposals, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Congress regarded both
phrases as equivalent. There are other equally plausible inferences. For instance, even assuming the proposed substitute was identical to the existing
wording, both phrases nonetheless refer only to present accumulations, not
all accumulations past and present as the Sixth Circuit urged. Likewise, the
phrase "gains and profits are permitted to remain accumulated" refers to profits
of the current year that are not distributed, as does "permitting its gains and
profits to accumulate." In view of the Senate's rejection of the House proposal
and underlying explanation in the report, it is also possible to infer a congres4
sional intent to penalize only current accumulations.6
Section 102 of the Revenue Act of 1934 allowed a corporation for the first
time to deduct dividends paid to its shareholders. 55 This deduction was available to corporations that had paid some dividends during the taxable year even
if they had unreasonably accumulated profits. Taxes were paid only on the
net income the corporation actually retained.56 For example, before the 1934
Act, if X Corporation earned $1,000,000 in the taxable year and distributed
$800,000 in dividends X would have a tax base of $1,000,000 even though the
accumulation was only $200,000. Under the 1934 Act's deduction for dividends,
the base would equal those earnings not distributed, $200,000. Allowing a deduction for dividends further supports restricting the tax to undistributed
current earnings. After 1934, once current earnings were distributed, there
would be no remaining tax base even if prior earnings remained accumulated.
The deduction for dividends in the 1934 Act referred to any distribution
out of earnings and profits. 57 A redemption constituted such a distribution to
the extent it was not chargeable to the corporation's capital account. 8 Morereasonably. The Service never did and there is no suggestion in the committee report or
elsewhere that it should have.
52. H.R. REP. No. 1, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 58-59 (Conf. Comm. Print 1927).
53. The report states: "Section 104(c) is substantially the same as section 220 of the 1926
Act . . . and provides that if any corporation ... is formed or availed of to permit its profits
to remain accumulated, in order to evade surtaxes, [the accumulated earnings tax] shall be
imposed." H.R. REP. No. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18, 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 384, 395-96 (emphasis added).
54. This was the conclusion reached by the Board of Tax Appeals in Corporate Inv. Co.
v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1156, 1172 (1939), non acq., 1940-1 C.B. 6. See also Comment, supra
note 10, at 664-65.
55. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 102(c), 48 Stat. 680, 702.
56. See H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12, 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 554, 562-63.
Actually, the tax base was equal to net income plus dividends received that were otherwise deductible from income at that time minus the dividends paid.
57. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 115(a), 48 Stat. 680, 711.
58. Id. § 115(c) (partial liquidation includes redemption), (i) (partial liquidation of
earnings and profits to extent not chargeable to capital account), 48 Stat. 680, 711-12.
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over, the 1934 Act removed capital gains treatment for all liquidation transactions including redemptions.2 Under the 1934 Act a redemption reduced
the corporation's earnings and profits and the tax base of adjusted net income. 60 Consequently, it is difficult to imagine a situation where a corporation's
prior earnings and profits could ever have triggered the tax.
As in previous Acts, the 1934 Act provided that the tax would not apply if
all shareholders included their entire pro rata share, whether distributed or
not, of the corporation's adjusted net income for such year in their own gross
incomes.61 This option reflects a congressional preference for pro rata shareholder inclusion. However, this shareholder election should not be read to prohibit corporations from avoiding the tax by fully distributing current earnings
in a non-pro rata fashion. No such limitation appears in the statute.
The changes of the Revenue Act of 1936 substantially shaped the current
provisions. For technical conformity with other Code provisions, the Act
changed the term "gains and profits" to "earnings and profits." 62 More significantly, the 1936 Act introduced a new and untried taxing regime for
corporations retaining income. Section 14(b) imposed a tax upon undistributed
net income without regard to the purpose of its retention. This tax was designed to prevent corporations from accumulating income while shareholders
avoided the applicable surtaxes. 63 The plan the House originally passed
adopted this new tax structure, and eliminated the existing accumulated
earnings tax. 64 As part of the House proposal, the deduction for dividends paid
was transferred from section 102 to section 27.65 Section 27 was to operate in
the context of the proposed new tax. The Senate refused to drop the existing
accumulated earnings provision, and kept section 102 in addition to the new
tax.66 The Senate version, which ultimately prevailed, amended section 102
to permit a deduction for dividends paid from the tax base as allowed in section
27.6?
It is important that section 27 was not enacted with section 102 in mind.
Congress never considered the impact of the dividends paid deduction con-

59. Id. § 115(c), 48 Stat. 680, 711. In 1936, favorable capital gains treatment was restored
for distributions in complete liquidation. Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 115(c), 49 Stat. 1648,
1687-88. In 1942 partial liquidations (involving redemptions) became eligible for capital gains
treatment. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 147, 56 Stat. 798, 841.
60. See Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 27(f), 49 Stat. 1648, 1665 (which explicitly permits
a deduction for distributions in liquidation which by virtue of § 115(c) & (i) include
partial liquidation and redemptions).
61. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 102(d), 48 Stat. 680, 702-03.
62. The change was not an attempt to alter existing law. See supra note 31.
63. See H.R. REP. No. 2475, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 667, 668.
64. Id. at 9, 1939-1 C.B. at 674. Actually, the House proposed that § 102, the accumulated
earnings tax provision, be revised to apply only to banks, insurance companies, foreign
corporations, China Trade Act corporations, certain domestic corporations doing business in
the possessions of the United States and personal holding companies. Id. 1939-1 C.B. at 674.
65. Under Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 27(g), 49 Stat. 1648, 1665, preferential dividends
did not qualify for the dividends paid deduction.
66. S. REP. No. 2156, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17, 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 678, 688.
67. Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 102(c)(2), 49 Stat. 1648, 1677.
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tained in section 27 upon section 102.68 That preferential dividends could reduce earnings and profits but not the tax base under section 102 never occurred
to Congress. Moreover, there is nothing in the 1936 Act that remotely suggests
once current earnings and profits were distributed, prior earnings could trigger
a tax on any remaining tax base.69 The House Report on the new tax dearly
states: "No attempt is made under the bill to tax past accumulations of
surplus." 70 In sum, the prohibition against deducting preferential dividends in
computing the accumulated earnings tax under the 1936 Act does not support
the conclusion that the tax can be triggered if all current earnings are distributed.
The confusion and hardship that the new tax on undistributed profits
71
generated in the 1936 Act led to its eventual abandonment in the Revenue
Act of 1938.72 The 1938 Act also adopted the predecessor of the consent
dividend provision in current section 565.73 In neither the 1938 Act nor the
subsequent acts culminating with the Revenue Act of 1954 is there any indication that Congress intended to assess any additional tax on a corporation
which distributed all its current earnings and profits in fact or by consent,
even though the corporation may have had a taxable base on which an ac7 4
cumulated earnings tax could have been applied.
When the history of the accumulated earnings tax is examined from its inception in 1913, there is absolutely no indication that Congress seriously considered whether current earnings and profits were a prerequisite for imposition
of the tax. Indeed, the question at hand is perhaps an illustration of the tax
68. Section 27 is the predecessor of § 562 (1976) while § 102 is the forerunner of § 532
(1976). See supra notes 65 & 67.
69. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 108-26, in which this paper takes the
position that a redemption at fair market value is in fact nonpreferential. There is no question
that a nonpreferential redemption qualified for the dividends paid deduction under the 1936
Act. See Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, §§ 27(0, 115(c) & (i), 49 Stat. 1648, 1665, 1687-89.
70. H.R. REP. No. 2475, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4, 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 667, 669.
71. See S. REP. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2-5, 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 779, 780-82; Revenue
Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 14, 52 Stat. 447, 456-57.
72. See CONF. REP., H.R. REP. No. 2330, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 32-33, 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2)
817-18. The surtax on undistributed profits was phased out by the end of 1939.
73. See H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 24, 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 728, 745. In general
terms, section 28 under the 1938 Act, like the current section 565, permits a corporation to
include as part of the dividends paid deduction, any undistributed net income as though the
amount had actually been distributed. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 28, 52 Stat. 447, 470-72.
Under current law, I.R.C. § 535(a) defines "accumulated taxable income," the tax base, to
include a deduction for dividends paid as defined in § 561 which incorporates qualifying
consent dividends under § 565.
The Revenue Act of 1938 also toughened the taxpayer's burden of justifying any accumulations by shifting the burden of proof to him. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 102, 52 Stat.
447, 483; United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297, 306 (1969).
74. The committee reports accompanying the Revenue Act of 1954 do not suggest any
change in the meaning of the phrase "permitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead
of being divided or distributed." See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 51-54, A172-74,
reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4017, 4077-80, 4311-13; S.REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 68-72, 314-18, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4621, 4700-04,
4954-58.
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lawyer's apocryphal rule of statutory interpretation: if the legislative history is
not dear on its face, turn to the wording of the statute.
The Statutory Provisions
After drawing conclusions from the largely inconclusive legislative history,
the Sixth Circuit in GPD turned to the statute itself and offered additional
reasons why section 532 triggers a tax in the absence of an accumulation of
earnings and profits in the current year. The court noted the unassailable fact
that prior accumulations are relevant in determining whether current accumulations are reasonable.75 Use of prior accumulations as an evidentiary
matter, however, does not mean that prior accumulations automatically act to
trigger corporate liability. 0 Acts committed during a period the statute of
limitations has dosed may be relevant evidence in determining some aspect
7
of a current matter, but those acts should not give rise to liability 7
Citing the wording of section 535(c)(1), the accumulated earnings credit,
the Sixth Circuit concluded that Congress knows how to write a clear provision
that pertains only to current earnings and profits. Section 535(c)(1) allows an
accumulated earnings credit against accumulated taxable income for "an
amount equal to such part of the earnings and profits for the taxable year as
are retained for the reasonable needs of the business."7 8 The court concluded
that the triggering accumulations in section 532 refer to accumulations from
any year; yet the language of section 535(c) points in the opposite direction. If
any prior accumulation could trigger the tax, Congress would have allowed
an earnings credit, which was not limited by current earnings, for prior earnings retained for the reasonable business needs. Congress was concerned, however, only with current earnings that were unreasonably accumulated. Hence,
in enacting section 535(c) the Senate commented: "Your committee has . . .
provided a credit for the profits of the taxable year which are retained for
the reasonable needs of the business.... This in effect provides two changes
in present law. In the future this tax will apply only to the amount unreasonably accumulated."79 The Senate's conclusion only makes sense if the reference
is to current earnings, because the credit applies only to the current year's earnings and profits.
In analyzing the accumulated earnings tax provisions, the Sixth Circuit in
75. 508 F.2d at 1087. See S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 74, at 317, reprinted in 1954 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4957.

76. 508 F.2d at 1087.
77. See Commissioner v. Disston, 325 US. 442, 449 (1955) (an adjustment in a net gift
figure for an earlier year closed by the statute of limitations can be used in determining gift
tax liability in an open year without subjecting the taxpayer to assessment and collection for
the closed year). See also Arthur W. Clark v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 126 (1977); Fred A. Berzon
v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 601, 620 (1975). In an analogous area Federal Rule of Evidence
§ 404(b) expresses the same concept. See, e.g., United States v. Rocha, 558 F.2d 615 (9th Cir.

1977).
78. I.R.C. § 535(c)(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
79. S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 74, at.72, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws at

4704 (emphasis added). The minimum credit after 1981 is $250,000. See supra note 4.
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GPD also relied on two points raised in Ostendorf-Morris Co. v. United
States,8 ° an unreported district court case involving the same issue. In Ostendorf-Morris, the district court hypothesized a situation where in year one, a
corporation, in accordance with the reasonable business needs, accumulates
earnings of 5500,000 for a redemption in year two.81 If in year two the corporation has current earnings of $500,000 and the redemption takes place, there
may be no current earnings to trigger a tax. According to the court, the result
is a double credit for earnings and profits used for the redemption. 82 The same
possibility for a double credit exists in any situation where a corporation
accumulates for a legitimate corporate purpose and subsequently does not use
the prior accumulated funds for that purpose.8 3 The solution to this problem is
for the Service to go back and assess a tax for the earlier year if it is still open
under the statute of limitations. If there is a danger the year might close, the
84
Service should secure an agreement that the year remain open.
The Ostendorf-Morris court supported its conclusion by pointing out the
absurd result when one cent of current earnings and profits not distributed in
the current year in a redemption transaction might trigger a tax on a large
tax base the redemption fails to diminish.8 5 The response to this suggestion is
twofold. First, because a small accumulation of earnings and profits can be
justified as necessary for the reasonable business needs it should not trigger
the tax. Alternatively, section 565 allows shareholders to elect to treat the
amount as a dividend by filing a consent with the corporation's tax return.
These consent dividends will decrease earnings and profits. 86 Thus, the
corporation that fails to distribute all of its current earnings and profits in a
redemption can have its shareholders file a consent for the remaining earnings, thereby avoiding the liability on the large tax base that the redemption
fails to reduce.
THE

RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN

A REDEMPTION

AND ACCUMULATED TAXABLE INCOME

In GPD, the taxpayer conceded that the redemption did not reduce its accumulated taxable income.87 This concession was probably prompted by section
80.

26 A.F.T.D.2d (P-H) ff 70,5369 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
1170-5372.
82. Id. at f170-5372 to -5373.
83. E.g., X Corporation accumulates $500,000 in year one for expected increased operating expenses in year two. In year two, X earns an unexpected $500,000 which it uses to pay
the operating expenses, reducing the adjusted taxable income to zero.
84. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1034 (West 1981), Treas. Reg. § 1.1034-1(i) (1960). A question
related to the treatment of pre-redemption accumulations is the treatment of post-redemption
accumulations when the taxpayer redeems with notes. See Rudolph, supra note 7, at 118-20;
Herwitz, supra note 13, at 900-04.
85. 26 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 5372.
86. Treas. Reg. § 1.565-3(a), T.D. 6777, 1965-1 C.B. 8, 12. See also I.R.C. § 563 (1976) permitting a distribution of the remaining earnings and profits after the close of the taxable
year to qualify as a distribution paid during the taxable year.
87. 508 F.2d at 1080. The taxpayer in Ostendorf-Morris made the same concession. 26
A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 5372.
81.

Id. at
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562(c), which provides that only distributions made on a pro rata basis, without preference, shall qualify for the dividends paid deduction.88 The Service
and the courts generally consider that a redemption of the shares of one shareholder is both non-pro rata and preferential because nonredeeming shareholders receive nothing from the corporation.8 9
As a matter of pure statutory interpretation it seems imprudent to apply
section 562(c) to redemptions. When read in conjunction with section 346(a),
section 562(b) clearly envisions a redemption as qualifying for the dividends
paid deduction. Indeed, section 346(a) unequivocally states: "For purposes of
section 562(b) . . . a partial liquidation includes a redemption of stock to
which section 302 applies." 90 If section 562(c) is applicable to redemptions, no
redemption could qualify for the dividends paid deduction because such distributions must be non-pro rata. Congress would not have singled out redemptions
for inclusion in section 562(b) only to completely eliminate them in section
562(c).
Neither the Congress nor the courts have focused on why preferential distributions should not qualify for the dividends paid deduction.91 Presumably,
the limitation was aimed at preventing corporations from eluding a corporate
level tax on undistributed earnings by distributing those earnings to selected
shareholders in low tax brackets. 92 This goal is suspect. The purpose of an
accumulated earnings tax is to prod a corporation into fully distributing or
gainfully employing its earnings rather than sheltering them from individual
tax rates. 93 If a corporation distributes its earnings to its shareholders, the form
of that distribution should be irrelevant. Disqualifying a redemption from the
dividends paid deduction undercuts section 302 which entitles a qualifying redemption to capital gains treatment. Section 532 is concerned with shareholders
avoiding individual income tax, not avoiding corporate dividend treatment.
The rate a shareholder is taxed on a distribution is irrelevant when considering
whether the dividends paid deduction is available. Section 562(b) qualifies some
capital gains transactions for the dividends paid deduction94 Moreover, even if
the recipient escapes tax altogether, the deduction may be available.
88. I.R.C. § 562(c) (1976) provides:
(c) Preferential Dividends -The amount of any distribution shall not be considered as a dividend for purposes of computing the dividends paid deduction, unless
such distribution is pro rata, with no preference to any share of stock as compared
with another class except to the extent that the former is entitled (without reference to
waivers of their rights by shareholders) to such preference.
89. See infra text accompanying notes 97-104. There is no indication that the terms "preferential" and "non-pro rata" are intended to set up two distinct tests.
90. I.R.C. § 346(a) (1976).
91. See Paul, The Federal Corporate Surplus Tax, 23 CORNELL L.Q. 72, 82-83 (1937)
(arguing against the preferential dividend limitation).
92. See, e.g., Black Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 977, 979 (6th Cir. 1942) (compelling distribution to shareholders in order to collect the tax on corporate surpluses).
93. See United States v. Donruss Co., 393 US. 297, 303 (1969); Helvering v. Chicago
Stock Yards Co., 318 U.S. 693, 699 (1943).
94. See, e.g., Deviney Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 1976 T.C.M. (P-H) ff76,386.
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The Revenue Act of 1936 provides that the dividend recipient's tax status
5
does not affect the dividend credit accorded the distributing corporation.1 If

state and federal law regulating corporate behavior, along with a corporation's
own bylaws and contractual obligations, permit the making of preferential
distributions under specified circumstances, the Code should not interfere by
penalizing sanctioned activities.96 A preferential distribution is not a sham.
The corporation makes a distribution of its earnings and profits and the recipient shareholders have income to report. In the case of a redemption, the
redeeming shareholder, in order to qualify under section 302, has to significantly decrease his equity interest in the corporation.
REDEMPTIONS AS NONPREFERENTIAL DISnUBUTIONS

The language of section 565(c) remains an obstacle to a dividends paid deduction for preferential distributions. However, if it can be shown that a redemption involving less than all of the shareholders is pro rata and nonpreferential, then whether current earnings and profits are necessary as a
triggering mechanism becomes irrelevant. By reducing accumulated taxable
income, a redemption might eliminate the tax base even if prior earnings
and profits trigger a tax.
In H. H. King FlourMills Co. v. United States,97 one of two fifty percent
shareholders in the plaintiff corporation surrendered his shares of stock in re-

demption for half of the corporation's assets. 98 Although the corporation had
been liable for the accumulated earnings tax in prior years the taxpayer contended that the tax was inapplicable to the year of redemption. Claiming a
dividends paid deduction under section 561 for the portion of the redemption
proceeds not chargeable to the corporation's capital account, the corporation
eliminated its accumulated taxable income.
The thrust of the corporation's argument was that section 562(c) required
only that the redemption be in proportion to the distributee's ownership
interest in order to be pro rata and nonpreferential. 99 The court rejected this
"novel theory" and followed the uniform interpretation that pro rata distribution must reflect the different proportional interest of the shareholders. 100
95. H.R. REP. No. 2475, 74th Cong., 2d Sess 11 (1936). See Helvering v. Credit Alliance
Corp., 122 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1941), afJ'd, 316 U.S. 107 (1942) (dividends paid deduction
allowed for nontaxable liquidating distribution).
96. As stated by Judge Learned Hand:
Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so arranging
one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everyone does so, rich or poor; and
all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands:
taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions. To demand more in the
name of morals is mere cant,
Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., dissenting), cited
with approval in Atlantic Coast Line v. Phillips, 332 U.S. 168, 173 (1947).
97. 325 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Minn. 1971).
98. The shareholders had executed an agreement which provided that either party could
have his stock redeemed by the corporation upon his request. Id. at 1086.
99. Id. at 1087.
100. Id. (footnote omitted).
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Unfortunately, the court in H. H. King is in the mainstream of the case
law. Typical earlier cases are May Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Commissionero - and
Forstner Chain Corp. v. Commissioner.0 2 In May Hosiery the taxpayer purchased a portion of the shareholders' preferred stock on the open market and
claimed a dividends paid credit under the predecessor of section 562(b).103 After
concluding that the preferential limitation applies to redemptions as well as
dividends, the court determined that the corporate purchases were preferential
since not all holders of the preferred stock surrendered their shares.0 4
In Forstner Chain the taxpayer offered to purchase from its three shareholders a specified number of preferred shares. Two of the shareholders waived
their rights while the third accepted. The court rejected the argument that the
distribution was not preferential due to the waiver by the nonredeeming shareholders. 105 In a recent private letter ruling, the Service continued to deny the
deduction without analysis. O When a redemption is analyzed it becomes clear
that it may be a nonpreferential, pro rata distribution. To illustrate: X
Corporation, with 120 shares outstanding, has two shareholders, A and B, who
each owns sixty shares with a fair market value of thirty dollars per share. X
Corporation, which was started when A and B each contributed $1,200 in
capital, has $1,200 earnings and profits in cash. 107 B needs $1,200 for personal
reasons and is willing to reduce his fifty percent interest in X to twenty-five
percent. If X Corporation were to redeem forty shares of B's stock for $1,200,
the Service would take the position that no portion of the redemption qualifies
for the dividends paid deduction because only B received cash. However, if B
received a $1,200 cash dividend while A received 120 shares of additional X
stock with a fair market value of $1,200,108 X would be entitled to a dividends
paid deduction which would decrease its adjusted taxable income. Both distribution patterns end in identical economic positions: B with $1,200 in cash,
twenty-five percent of X Corporation and stock worth $600 and A with seventyfive percent of X stock worth $1,800.109 If one pattern justifies a dividends paid
deduction, there is no reason why the other should not.
Consider the nonredeeming shareholders' position in a clearly preferential
distribution. Suppose X Corporation had merely distributed $1,200 as a divi101. 42 B.T.A. 646 (1940), afJd, 123 F.2d 858 (4th Cir. 1941).
102. 45 B.T.A. 19 (1941). See also Safety Convoy Co. v. Thomas, 189 F.2d 219 (5th Cir.
1943); George E. Warren Co. v. United States, 53 F. Supp. 578 (D. Mass. 1944); I.T. 3244,
1939-1 C.B. 181, 182.
103. Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 14(a)(2), 49 Stat. 1648, 1656 (1936).
104. 123 F.2d at 861.
105. 45 B.T.A. at 21.
106. Letter Ruling 8033031. See also Letter Ruling 630503588A.
107. This illustration will ignore any application of the accumulated earnings tredit
provided by § 535(c).
108. Following the distribution, there would be 240 shares of stock participating in the
$2,400 of X Corporation assets.

109. After the redemption, A owns 60 out of 80.shares or 75% of the outstanding shares.
Following the stock and cash distribution, A would still own 75%, represented by 180 out of
240 shares. In both patterns X Corporation after having distributed $1,200 in cash has a fair
market value of $2,400.
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dend to B. The distribution -would have decreased the value of X from $3,600
to $2,400 and accordingly the fair market value of the stock held by A and B
from $1,800 to $1,200 each. Consequently, B would hold $1,200 in stock and
$1,200 in cash after the distribution while A would only hold $1,200 in stock.
Under these facts B has increased his involvement from $1,800 of stock
originally to $2,400 in stock and cash while A's holdings decreased from $1,800
to $1,200.
If this were a redemption and B surrenders forty shares upon receiving
$1,200 from X Corporation, A receives the equivalent of a stock dividend. Instead of holding stock with a fair market value of $1,200, A's stock increases in
value to $1,800.110 Upon surrendering forty shares of stock, B decreases his stock
ownership from sixty to twenty shares or from $1,200 to $600. B has received
$1,200 of cash from X Corporation but only by transferring $600 in stock to
A. When the smoke clears, A and B continue to be in the same relative positions: B holds twenty shares of X stock worth $600 and $1,200 in cash, a total
of $1,800, the value of his original holding in X while A continues to own X
stock with a fair market value of $1,800. The redemption does not treat either
shareholder preferentially.
The House Report on the Revenue Act of 1938111 indicated that distributing stock to some shareholders while distributing cash to others qualifies for a
dividends paid deduction.1 1 2 Similarly, in SoutheasternFinance Co. v. Commissioner,"* the Tax Court recognized that a distribution in which some share4
holders get stock and others get cash in a pro rata amount is not preferential .
Both the House Report and Southeastern Finance discussed situations where
the shareholders had the option of choosing cash or stock. In a redemption
situation, the nonredeeming shareholders have no option to receive cash; instead they constructively receive stock inasmuch as their percentage of stock
ownership increases." 5 Yet the fact that the nonredeeming shareholders receive
110. Following the redemption there are 80 shares outstanding participating in X's assets
of $2,400 or $30 per share. A owns 60 shares.

111. H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1, 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 728.
112. In discussing how minor variations in the value of distributions will not taint a
distribution as preferential, the Report cites the following example:
To illustrate: Suppose the case in which a stock dividend distribution is coupled with
an option equally available to all the shareholders to take cash or stock, and in which
$100 in cash is paid to one shareholder, while there is issued to another shareholder
one share of stock which happens to have, on the date on which the distribution was
authorized, or on the date of its receipt by the shareholder, an exchange value of
$99.75. An impartial distribution of this character should not be considered to be preferential. Such has been the Treasury's construction of the existing law.
Id. at 23, 1939-1 C.B. at 744.
113. 4 T.C. 1069 (1945).
114. Id. at 1090-91. See also Union Sugar Co. v. Commission, 1 T.C.M. (CCH) 159 (1942).
115. In many closely held corporations, a decision to distribute earnings and profits in
a redemption to avoid the accumulated earnings tax probably could be made available to

all shareholders without foreclosing the transaction. If the option is open, the redemption
is tantamount to an election under I.R.C. § 305(b)(1) (1976) and fits squarely within the
language of the legislative history.
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one form of property while the redeeming shareholders receive another should
be irrelevant if the fair market values are the same. Assuming accurate
valuation, a rational shareholder should be indifferent to receiving $100 in
stock or $100 in cash.116
While both the House Report and Southeastern Finance discussed dividend
distribution characterized under the predecessor to section 305(b)(1), there is
no reason to presume that a distribution under section 305(b)(2) would run
afoul of the preferential restrictions of section 562(c). assuming shareholders
received pro rata distributions as measured using the value of what they received. Because a distribution under section 305(b)(2) is economically equivalent
to a redemption, a redemption of stock at fair market value must also be
adjudged nonpreferential.
The House Report on the Revenue Act of 1938 supports the interpretation
that a preferential distribution is one that diverts corporate assets away from
some shareholders to other shareholders rather than one that preserves a
balance among shareholders. 17 A redemption at fair market value is ordinarily
completely consistent with the rights of all shareholders. An individual pur8
chasing stock may be protected against preferential distributions," but no
corporation will ensure that it will not purchase the shares of other stockholders at fair market values or that, if it does, other shareholders have the
right to redeem."19 Indeed, there is no need for such assurances because a fair
116. This conclusion ignores transaction costs which may make stock ownership slightly
less desirable. However, in general the costs incurred on the sale of stock are not great.
Moreover, the costs offset the selling price thereby reducing gain recognized on the sale or
creating a loss deduction. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(e), TID. 6794, 1965-1 C.B. 128, 133-34. In
addition to transaction costs, the stock's transferability may be restricted, but any restriction
should be reflected in the value of the stock received because expected earnings would be
discounted at a higher rate due to the illiquidity.
117. H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 23, 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 728, states in part
that:
Subsection (h) of the bill, relating to "preferential dividends" has the same purpose
as section 27(g) of the existing law .... No dividends-paid credit should be allowed
in the case of a distribution not in conformity with the rights of shareholders generally
inherent in their stockholdings, whether the preferential distribution reflects an act
of injustice to shareholders or a device acquiesced in by shareholders, rigged with a view
to tax avoidance .... The committee believes that no distribution which treats share-

holders with substantial impartiality and in a manner consistent with their rights
under their stockholding interest, should be regarded as preferential by reason of
minor differences in valuations of property distributed.
Id. at 744.
118. See, e.g., Wilderman v. Wilderman, 315 A2d 610 (Del. Ch. 1974), where the court
ordered repayment of excessive compensation taxed as dividend distribution. For examples
of judicial relief from preferential distributions, see Chicago Stadium Corp. v. Scallen, 530
F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1976) (control shareholders issued themselves treasury shares); Corbin v.
Corbin, 429 F. Supp. 276 (M.D. Ga. 1977) (diversion of cash and auto for personal use);
Miller v. Magline, 76 Mich. App. 284, 256 N.W.2d 761 (1977) (control shareholder withheld
dividends while paying himself high salary).
119. See Moas. Buswnms Comu. Aar (MBCA) § 6 (empowering a corporation to acquire
its own shares), § 15 (authorizing corporations to issue corporate shares "with such designations, preferences, limitations, and relative rights as shall be stated in the articles of in-
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market value redemption has no unfair effects on the holdings of the nonredeemers.
A distribution is preferential when corporate assets are diverted from some
shareholders to others. In the example above, if X Corporation distributed a
$1,200 dividend to B, A and B would each hold sixty shares of stock valued at
$1,200 instead of $1,800. Thus, while A would hold $1,200 of value as a result
of his corporate association, B would hold $2,400. These facts show a preferential distribution to B under section 562(c). Arguably, because only $600
of the distribution represents a diversion from A, the other $600 is nonpreferential and therefore should not be precluded from the dividends paid
deduction. However, courts have uniformly ruled that the entire distribution
fails to qualify.

1 20

The predecessor to section 562(c) was enacted to quiet congressional fears
that corporations would escape taxation on accumulated earnings by funneling
a distribution to a shareholder in a low individual tax bracket. 121 While congressional fears might be realized where preferential dividends are used, qualifying redemptions offer no such concern. When a corporation makes a qualifying
redemption it receives stock from the redeeming shareholder, who must relinquish a degree of his equity in the corporation upon receiving the distribution. There is no sham involved: the corporation cannot hide assets because it
has been enriched in an amount equal to the redeemed stock.
While the case law for the most part does not favor distinguishing between
preferential dividends and nonpreferential redemptions, there are exceptions.
In both National Securities Series v. Commissioner 22 and New York Stocks
v. Commissioner, 23 courts allowed corporations to deduct redemption proceeds
corporation") (1979). As stated in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc.,

367 Mass. 578, 598 n.24, 328 N.E.2d 505, 518 n.24 (1975):
Of course, a close corporation may purchase shares from one stockholder without offering the others an equal opportunity if all other stockholders give advance consent to the
stock purchase arrangements through acceptance of an appropriate provision in the
articles of organization, the corporate by-laws ....
or a stockholder's agreement ....
Similarly, all other stockholders may ratify the purchase.
Id, 328 N.E.2d at 518 n.24 (citations omitted). Under the particular facts of Donahue, the
court held that the corporation was bound to offer every shareholder an equal opportunity
to sell his shares back to the corporation. Id. at 602, 328 N.E.2d at 519. In Donahue the shares
owned by the elderly father of the controlling shareholders were purchased for $800 per share
when within the previous four years the corporation had offered to purchase shares owned by

minority shareholders at prices ranging from $40 to $200 per share. Id. at 583, 328 N.E.2d at
510. See also Brown v. Little, Brown & Co., 269 Mass. 102, 168 N.E. 521 (1929).
120. See, e.g., Black Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1942). In Black,
dividend payments were not made in proportion to stock ownership. The two principal
shareholders received 100% of their pro rata portion while sixteen other shareholders received only 50% of their respective shares and one received only 25%. Id. at 979. The court
denied any dividends paid credit for the entire distribution, not just that portion of the

distribution which was a diversion from the nonreceiving shareholders.
121.
122.

See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
13 T.C. 884 (1949).

123. 164 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1947). See also Letter Rulings 6305035880A & 5410056230A
following National Securities Series and New York Stocks.
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in calculating the dividends paid credit. However, these cases involved openend regulated investment companies and have been distinguished in subse124
quent decisions on that basis.
The taxpayer in New York Stocks was required to distribute at least ninety
percent of its current income in exchange for a privileged tax status. Investors
were entitled to surrender their shares at any time in exchange for their proportionate share of earnings, profits and assets. The court allowed a dividends
paid deduction on each redemption because it would have been impossible to
make balancing payments to all the nonredeeming shareholders. Emphasizing
the availability of the redemption procedure to all taxpayers on an impartial
basis, the court reasoned the distribution was fair because redeeming shareholders got their proportionate share of earnings at redemption and nonre125
deeming shareholders would be paid at the end of dividend period.
The thrust of the court's argument is correct, but whether or not the nonredeeming shareholders receive dividends is irrelevant. Even if their proportionate share of earnings are not distributed, the nonredeeming shareholders
will enjoy appreciation in the value of their stock. Any liquidity problems to
realizing that appreciation should have been reflected in the original price of
the stock to the shareholder. Thus, if shareholder A invests $500 in X Corporation stock and A's ability to sell or redeem, is restricted, A might insist upon
receiving $700 face value of restricted stock as compensation for lost liquidity.
If B had purchased $500 of unrestricted stock that gave him the right to have
his holdings redeemed and he does so, A is not treated disadvantageously. A's
stock appreciates by his proportional share of the earnings, and his $700 holding compensates him for any lack of liquidity.
Under similar facts, the Tax Court in National Securities followed New
York Stocks and concluded:
Where a distribution is made available in conformity with the rights
of each stockholder, where no act of injustice to any stockholder is contemplated or perpetrated, where there is no suggestion of a tax avoidance scheme, and where each stockholder is treated with absolute impartiality, the distribution is not preferential within the meaning of the
statute.126
Assuming that a redemption is in conformity with a corporation's legal obligations to its shareholders, the thrust of the court's statement is equally applicable where a shareholder's decision not to have his shares redeemable at
124. See, e.g., H.H. King, 325 F. Supp. 1088 n.2.

125. 164 F.2d at 79. The court stated that: "More important is the fact that every shareholder receives his fair proportion of the earnings during the period he elects to remain an
owner, those redeeming being paid when they redeem, those retaining ownership being paid
at the end of petitioner's dividend period." Id.
126. 13 T.C. at 888, quoting United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Commissioner, I T.C.
424, 430 (1943). Where the court held that a recapitalization in which some shareholders
received cash while others elected to postpone their exchange would not be treated as preferential since all shareholders could eventually receive their pro rata share. See also Union
Sugar Co. v. Commissioner, 1 T.C.M. (CCH) 159 (1942) (redemption of preferred shareholders
in exchange for cash or common stock was not preferential).
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will is made when the stock is purchased as when the decision is later made by
not exercising an option to redeem.
CONCLUSION

The problem of applying the dividends paid credit to redemptions arises
only because the accumulated earnings tax provisions employ a different
concept for the triggering and base measure. The best resolution of the
problem would be to use the same measures to trigger the tax and to complete the tax. If the tax is designed to limit corporate ability to retain earnings
and profits, then Congress should base the tax on current retentions without
regard to the character of distributions. Even given the dichotomy of the
triggering and base measures, however, a redemption at fair market value that
would be necessarily nonpreferential, which distributes all of a corporation's
earnings and profits for the year or years in issue, should still relieve the
corporation of accumulated earnings tax liability regardless of the reason for
the redemption.
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